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Most of the world’s poorest people depend on farming for their livelihood. 
Earnings from farming in low-income countries are depressed partly due to a pro-urban 
bias in own-country policies, and partly because richer countries (including some 
developing countries) favor their farmers with import barriers and subsidies. Both sets of 
policies reduce national and global economic growth and add to inequality and poverty in 
developing countries. Acknowledgement of that since the 1980s has given rise to greater 
pressures for reform, both internal and external. 
Over the past two decades numerous developing country governments have 
reduced their sectoral and trade policy distortions, while many high-income countries 
continue with protectionist policies that harm developing country exports of farm 
products.  
Recent research suggests that the agricultural protectionist policies of high-
income countries reduce welfare in many developing countries. Most of those studies 
also suggest that full global liberalization of merchandise trade would raise value added 
in agriculture in developing country regions, and that much of the benefit from global 
reform would come not just from reform in high-income countries but also from 
liberalization among developing countries, including in many cases own-country reform. 
These findings raise three key questions that are addressed in turn in this paper: 
To what extent have the reforms of the past two decades succeeded in reducing 
distortions to agricultural incentives? Do current policy distortions still discriminate 
against farmers in low-income countries? And what are the prospects for further reform 
in the next decade or so?  
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Most of the world’s poorest people depend on farming for their livelihood. 
Earnings from farming in low-income countries are depressed partly due to a pro-urban 
bias in own-country policies, and partly because richer countries (including some 
developing countries) favor their farmers with import barriers and subsidies. Both sets of 
policies reduce national and global economic growth and add to inequality and poverty in 
developing countries. Acknowledgement of that since the 1980s has given rise to greater 
pressures for reform, both internal and external. 
Over the past two decades numerous developing country governments have 
reduced their sectoral and trade policy distortions (World Bank 2001, Ch. 2), and many 
now argue high-income countries should reduce their remaining protectionism that harms 
developing country exports of farm products. Indeed they have been insisting on such 
commitments on farm policies in the WTO’s current round of multilateral trade 
negotiations (the Doha Development Agenda) before they will consider offering any 
further reform commitments of their own.  
Recent research by Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2006a,b) and 
Tangermann (2005) supports earlier findings (e.g. by Anderson et al. 2001) that the 
agricultural protectionist policies of high-income countries reduce welfare in many 
developing countries. Those studies, and a forthcoming one by Anderson and Valenzuela 
(2007), also suggest that full global liberalization of merchandise trade would raise value 
added in agriculture in most developing country regions, and that much of the benefit   4
from global reform would come not just from reform in high-income countries but also 
from liberalization among developing countries, including in many cases own-country 
reform. 
These findings, together with the concerns raised in the AAEA Fellows Addresses 
by Pinstrup-Andersen (2002) and Falcon (2005), raise three key questions that are the 
subject of this paper: To what extent have the reforms of the past two decades succeeded 
in reducing distortions to agricultural incentives? Do current policy distortions still 
discriminate against farmers in low-income countries? And what are the prospects for 
further reform in the next decade or so? Those questions are addressed in turn, after first 
reviewing briefly the development of price and trade distortions up to the mid-1980s. The 
paper concludes by suggesting areas where improvements in economic analysis of the 
causes and effects of such distortionary policies could encourage further reform. 
 
Policy developments to the mid-1980s 
 
Historically, countries have tended to gradually change from taxing to subsidizing 
agriculture relative to other sectors in the course of their economic development – 
although less so, and at a later stage of development, the stronger a country’s comparative 
advantage in agriculture (Anderson and Hayami 1986; Lindert 1991). Exceptions were 
rich countries with an extreme comparative advantage in agriculture (Australia, New 
Zealand) and poor countries with an extreme comparative disadvantage in agriculture 
(South Korea, as with Japan earlier, and some oil-rich states). Poor-country farmers also 
have been disadvantaged by a pro-urban bias in public investments in infrastructure and   5
human capital (education, health, agricultural R&D), and sometimes also by being forced 
to sell at low prices so the government could depress urban consumer food prices 
(Byerlee and Sain 1986; Pinstrup-Andersen 1988). Within the agricultural sector of each 
country, import-competing industries tended to be less disadvantaged than exporting ones 
(Krueger, Schiff and Valdes 1988; Tyers and Anderson 1992; Herrmann et al. 1992; 
Thiele 2004). Krueger, Schiff and Valdes also found that distortions to agricultural 
incentives were more negative the lower a country’s per capita income, with their 
measure taking into account not only direct distortions to agricultural prices, such as 
export taxes, but also indirect ones which attracted resources away from agriculture, such 
as manufacturing protection and overvalued exchange rates. 
As well as that cross-country evidence, a third illustration of the association 
between agricultural protection and per capita income is provided by time series 
estimates for Northeast Asia. As Japan began to industrialize in the first half of the 
twentieth century, it imposed an ever-higher tariff on rice imports. Following their 
independence, Korea and Taiwan – like former colonies elsewhere – initially chose 
policies that discouraged agriculture; but their rapid industrialization was soon 
accompanied by less taxation and then increasing protection for farmers, following 
Japan’s example (figure 1).   
The anti-trade bias of policies in poor countries was often argued as being 
necessary for governments to raise enough government revenue to provide public goods, 
but that is unconvincing on at least two grounds. First, a uniform export tax (which, by 
Lerner’s (1936) Symmetry Theorem is equivalent to an import tax) would have been 
much more efficient than the mixture of unequal import and export taxes plus   6
quantitative trade restrictions that was used along with overvalued and often multiple 
foreign exchange rates. Second, if tax revenue raising was the motive for sectoral 
distortions to incentives, how does one explain the subsidies for fertilizer, farm credit and 
irrigation that numerous democratic developing countries provide their farmers – the 
benefits of which are typically in proportion to farm size and so highly inequitable (see, 
e.g., Gulati and Narayanan 2003)? 
A more convincing explanation of why poor countries penalize agriculture and 
rich countries subsidize it has to do with the differing distributional effects of government 
interventions and the relative costs of lobbying the government by the key interest groups 
(Anderson 1995). Because farmers are mainly subsisting in poor agrarian economies, 
their real incomes are not greatly affected by increases in farm output prices – whereas 
the urban population is far smaller and more easily able to organize, and food is an 
important part of consumer budgets. As economies develop, however, farmers become 
fewer in number and easier to organize. They also become more commercially oriented 
such that their real incomes are more strongly influenced by agricultural output prices. 
Meanwhile, the urban population becomes larger and hence more difficult to organize, 
and the importance of food in consumer budgets and the setting of wage rates declines. 
The end result can be a rapid increase in agricultural protection rates in high-growth 
middle-income economies. 
 
Policy developments – and pitfalls – since the mid-1980s 
   7
Left unchecked, as economies in developing countries grow their governments 
might be expected to begin protecting agriculture, thereby replacing one costly policy 
regime with another. That prospect contributed to the resolve of several groups in the 
1980s to try to counter national political forces with international influences. For 
example, agricultural-exporting countries formed the Cairns Group and succeeded in 
ensuring that an agreement on agricultural reform was included in the Uruguay Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations. Over the same period, and following two World 
Development Reports on the topic (World Bank 1982, 1986), international financial 
institutions made a more concerted effort to encourage developing countries to reduce 
unilaterally their distortions against agriculture. Accession to preferential trading 
agreements and to the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the demise of communism, 
helped in some cases too. 
The net effect of these developments on import tariffs is now evident. Simple 
average ad valorem tariffs have fallen considerably over the past two decades in low-, 
middle- and high-income countries (table 1). They have fallen less, and still remain 
higher, for agriculture than non-agriculture (and would even more so if specific tariffs 
were included), but if there were no other distortions these changes would suggest a 
decline in the anti-trade bias. 
Farmers in developing countries have benefited indirectly from their 
governments’ cuts not only in manufacturing protection but also in distortions to 
exchange rates. Overvaluation can discourage production of all tradables relative to 
nontradable goods and services (except if the government allows a parallel currency 
market to develop, in which case the outcome depends on which groups of importers are   8
still favored). An indication of the decline in exchange rate distortions is the huge 
reduction in black market premia in markets for foreign currency in all developing 
country regions. For a sample of 59 developing countries for which data are available, 
table 2 reports that the trade-weighted average premium has fallen from over 140 percent 
in the 1960s to around 80 percent in the 1970s and 1980s and to just 9 percent in the early 
1990s. Direct taxation of agricultural exports has diminished too, although some still 
remains, including implicitly via parastatal marketing enterprises.
1 
While there is still plenty of piecemeal evidence of anti-agricultural policies in 
many developing countries, including via informal taxes by local and provincial 
governments as in China and Sub-Saharan Africa (Lin et al. 2002, Townsend 1999), 
some analysts suggest the bias against agriculture has now disappeared (see, e.g., the 
national general equilibrium analyses in Jensen, Robinson and Tarp 2002). However, 
numerous more-advanced developing countries are moving from an anti-agricultural bias 
to being increasingly pro-agricultural, particularly for some import-competing food 
industries. That bias, which can be just as welfare-reducing as an anti-agricultural bias, is 
at least partly in response to the rapidly widening gap between farm and non-farm 
household incomes that often accompanies rapid industrialization – even though farm 
incomes might be rising in absolute terms (Hayami 2005).  
In OECD countries, the average agricultural producer support estimate (PSE) has 
fallen from 37 percent in 1986-88 (the beginning of the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations) to 30 percent in 2005, but that nonetheless represents more dollars and 
Euros now than two decades ago. True, the proportion of the PSE that is now at least 
somewhat decoupled from production has risen from less than one-tenth to more than   9
one-quarter over that period (figure 2). But not all the re-instrumentation is towards less 
production- and trade-distorting measures. Of particular note is the growth in non-tariff 
import barriers ostensibly for food safety or environmental reasons. Two cases that have 
already been subject to WTO dispute settlement are the EU’s restrictions on imports of 
beef from cattle that have been fed growth hormones, and of food and feed products 
containing genetically modified organisms (GMOs). In both cases the EU was found by 
the WTO’s panel and appellate body to be not in conformity with its obligations, yet 
neither case has been settled to the satisfaction of the complainants. 
As for trade between high-income and developing countries, the EU claims 
leadership in providing non-reciprocal preferential access to its markets for its former 
colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) under the Cotonou Agreement. 
Earlier this decade it also began providing duty-free and quota-free access to its markets 
for ‘everything but arms’ to UN-designated Least Developed Countries (LDCs), although 
it also excluded services and it continues to delay the opening of three sensitive food 
markets (bananas, rice and sugar). These measures may help the better-off ACP and LDC 
farmers with a marketable surplus although, in the case of ACP supplies subject still to 
quotas, most of the benefits accrue to the holders of EU import quotas (who are more 
likely to be from a European than an ACP country). But these preferential agreements 
necessarily are at the expense of very many more equally poor exporters in other (non-
ACP, non-LDC) developing countries including China, Indonesia, India, Pakistan and 
Vietnam. Whether they are a net help to preference-receiving and other developing 
countries is an empirical question that can only be answered with an empirical model that 
incorporates all those trade preferences in its protection database.    10
 
Are current policies still harming farmers in developing countries? 
   
What do the available protection database and model from Purdue University’s 
Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) say about recent distortions? The database 
suggests that as of 2001, and consistent with table 1, the import-weighted average 
nominal ad valorem tariff and subsidy interventions were greater in agriculture than other 
primary sectors and manufacturing even in developing countries, although less so than in 
high-income countries. Using the GTAP model, Anderson and Valenzuela (2007) report 
the effects on agricultural value added (real net farm income) of full global liberalization 
of those import tariffs and agricultural subsidies. The results, reported in table 3, suggest 
that real net farm income would rise in all key developing countries and regions with a 
move to free trade. Moreover, that rise is greater than the increase in value added in non-
farm sectors except in Sub-Saharan Africa (where the two rise by a similar amount). That 
is, according to the GTAP database and model, developing country farmers as a group are 
still being discriminated against by the structure of distortions as of 2001.  
That estimated positive impact of such reform on farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa 
is consistent with results using another global economy-wide model known as Linkage. 
That model has been used by Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2006c) to 
explicitly address a question raised by Panagariya (2005), who suggests that such a 
region would be likely to lose from liberalization of at least OECD agricultural 
protection. The basis of Panagariya’s suggestion has two elements. One is that net food-
importing countries of the region would lose because OECD reform would raise   11
international food prices. The other is that many of the region’s countries are LDCs or 
ACP countries and so get preferential access to the high-priced food markets of OECD 
countries, liberalization of which would cause preference erosion. But these are only two 
of the numerous aspects of this issue. Also relevant is what happens to the non-
agricultural terms of trade for regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and to the 
prices of its agricultural exports that are not sold in preferential markets. So their impact 
on national economic welfare, and in particular on net farm incomes, needs to be 
examined as well. 
  Linkage modeling results addressing Panagariya’s question find that the region’s 
agricultural and food import price index rises, but so too does the export price index for 
those goods. Evidently the rise in demand for SSA exports enjoying little or no 
preferential access more than outweighs the reduced earnings from their exports that have 
been enjoying substantial preferences. And while the price of other imported goods also 
rises slightly, the price of SSA’s exports of non-agricultural goods rises even more. The 
relative importance of each of these sets of price changes in contributing to the changes 
in regional economic welfare is summarized in table 4, which reveals two things. First, 
the negative contribution to SSA welfare from higher import prices is more than offset by 
the positive contribution from higher export prices (except for farm products in South 
Africa where they almost cancel out). Second, the contributions on both the export and 
import side are larger from non-agricultural than from agricultural price changes. So even 
though the price changes for SSA from high-income country agricultural liberalization 
are smaller for non-farm than farm products, the greater weight of non-farm products 
means their net positive welfare contribution to SSA via the terms of trade effect is   12
greater.
2 The overall impact on SSA net farm incomes is a boost of 7 percent, and the real 
value of the region’s agricultural and food exports would rise by more than 80 percent 
(Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe 2006c, table 7). 
 
Prospects for policy reform in the next decade 
 
Since the process of reform is far from complete, pressures to open up markets 
will continue multilaterally, preferentially and unilaterally, while groups with vested 
interests in current policies will continue to counter-lobby to retain and increase sectoral 
assistance. How might these net out? 
Multilaterally, the WTO membership has had agricultural tariff and subsidy cuts 
high on its Doha Development Agenda, but as of July 2006 the political willingness to 
reform varied too much between the key players for an agreement to be in sight. If no 
agreement is forthcoming by early 2007, and if the U.S. President is unable to secure a 
renewal of fast-track authority when it expires in July 2007, it could be several more 
years before that round of negotiations is concluded. Even then, the extent of reform 
agreed to could be quite modest. Three components in particular matter. One is the large 
‘binding overhang’ in current tariffs and subsidies, which means large cuts in legally 
bound rates will be required to ensure real cuts in applied rates of subsidies and tariffs. 
Another is the exceptional treatment for ‘sensitive’ and ‘special’ farm products that 
subjects them to lesser cuts (and possibly to no tariff cap, should one be introduced for 
other products). The third is the extent to which developing countries are granted ‘special 
and differential treatment’ in the form of lesser cuts and longer phase-in periods, with   13
LDCs not required to reform at all. As shown by Martin and Anderson (2006), together 
those elements could be sufficient to wipe out entirely any immediate gain for low-
income countries from agricultural reform under Doha – although the lowering of the 
‘binding overhang’ could help agricultural exporters in future years of low international 
prices (Francois and Martin 2004) and would make it easier for subsequent rounds to 
make more-effective cuts. The outlawing of export subsidies also would be a gain to the 
subsidizing countries and to other food-exporting countries, albeit at the expense of food-
importing countries currently enjoying lower import prices because of those subsidies. 
Additionally, WTO could continue to contribute through the process of 
negotiating accession of new members. That process managed to extract large cuts in 
agricultural protection in China, whose tariffs and subsidies are now legally bound at low 
rates averaging less than 20 percent. If WTO accession can lead to low legal bindings on 
tariffs and subsidies for other large acceding countries (Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, 
Vietnam, Iran), that could be a significant achievement if the counterfactual is rising 
support for agriculture in those economies. To appreciate this point, imagine what figure 
1 above would have looked like if Japan and Korea, when they signed the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1955 and 1967 respectively, had been constrained like 
China now is: their nominal rates of protection also would be less than 20 percent, instead 
of ten times that rate.
3 
There are two consequences of the WTO’s Doha round going into suspension in 
late July 2006. One is that some members will begin dispute settlement proceedings 
against others, particularly in agriculture now the ‘peace clause’ has expired. That always 
has the potential to bring about reform, but recent experiences with the WTO’s beef   14
hormone, banana, and cotton cases demonstrate that this can be a long process with 
sometimes little or no liberalization emerging from it. The other consequence of Doha not 
progressing is that countries will again turn their attention to prospective regional and 
other preferential trading agreements (PTAs). Yet the record of those arrangements in 
freeing up agricultural markets is no better than that of multilateral negotiations.  
The political economy of trade policy is not often conducive to unilateral reform. 
The current wave of globalization, however, is lowering both natural and governmental 
costs of doing business abroad. That raises the benefits from opening one’s own economy 
and simultaneously raises the costs of poor economic governance, since capital flight to 
better-governed economies is becoming ever cheaper, easier and faster.  
A second phenomenon altering the political economy of reform is the agricultural 
biotechnology revolution: it offers potentially high payoffs to early adopters, especially if 
the Doha round were to cause markets to open, while non-adopters may lose because of 
the price downturn following biotech adoption by others. This is clearest in the case of 
cotton (Anderson and Valenzuela 2006), but applies also in the case of rice and other 
foods (Anderson, Jackson and Nielsen 2005, Anderson and Jackson 2005). It is true even 
if those new varieties contain GMOs, so long as significant parts of the world do not 
require GM labeling.  
A third phenomenon that is altering the political economy is the increasing 
concentration of firms in the food value chain. As processors and retailers exploit new 
economies of scale with falls in international transport and communication costs, and 
become more global in focus, they are becoming ever-stronger lobbyists for openness in 
markets abroad. Those nations that reduce barriers early will best position their agri-food   15
sectors and consumers to take advantage of this revolution. In practice for developing 
countries this means increasing contestability in the processing and marketing of their 
farm products and inputs, and focusing rural public expenditures more on reducing 
underinvestment in public-good institutions and infrastructures to lubricate that value 
chain rather than on inequitable and inefficient farm input subsidies.
4  
 
Where can the economics profession contribute more to the policy reform process? 
 
Better empirical research on the extent, causes and effects of policy is needed to 
encourage developing countries to further reform their sectoral and trade policies.
5 
Consider those three areas in turn. 
 
Estimating the changing extent of distortions 
Empirical analysis on the degree of interventions in agricultural markets has been 
provided for almost 20 years by the Secretariat of the OECD (2006) for developed 
countries plus Korea, Mexico, some of Europe’s transition economies and a handful of 
large developing countries, in what are now called Producer Support Estimates (PSEs). 
No such comparable series has been generated for long periods for other developing 
countries since the Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988) study which covered the 1960-
1984 period for 18 developing countries, apart from a nine-year update for the Latin 
American countries in that sample by the same country authors (Valdes 1996), and a 
comparable study of 7 central and eastern European countries (Valdes 2000). An   16
exception is a new set of estimates of nominal rates of protection since 1985 for a few 
key farm products in China, India, Indonesia and Vietnam (Orden et al. 2006).  
Better PSE-type estimates of the extent of price distortions facing farmers and 
other producers would improve policy transparency directly by providing stand-alone 
indicators that are easily understood by participants in policy debate. If they show the 
relative contributions of different policy instruments to the aggregate PSE, they can also 
assist trade negotiators to select their priorities. And if they are provided in the right 
format they can supplement the GTAP protection database used by most global modelers, 
which currently relies mostly on applied tariff rates to represent distortions to agricultural 
prices in developing countries (see www.gtap.org).  
Even though the latest protection estimates, for 2001, are a vast improvement over 
earlier estimates provided by GTAP, shortcomings remain. One is that there may be 
unused protection in such tariffs, for example due to duty exemptions and drawbacks 
(Ianchovichina 2004). It is also possible that nontariff import barriers such as quarantine 
restrictions or food quality standards exist such that the applied tariff understates the 
actual protection level. Indeed recent measures of the Trade Restrictiveness Index suggest 
that there is nearly as much import protection from nontariff measures as from tariffs 
(Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga 2006). Third, production or export taxes or non-tax export 
restrictions, or exchange rate distortions – all largely ignored in the GTAP protection 
database – may be still in place. A fourth is that value added taxes on agricultural 
products (and excise taxes on alcoholic beverages and tobacco) may be applied at the 
border on imported products but not – or not as fully – on domestically produced like 
products.
6 Informal (often illegal) taxes in cash or kind are often levied on farmers by   17
local governments too (Townsend 1999; Lin et al. 2002). Moreover, few developing 
country subsidies, including for farm inputs and to food consumers, are captured in the 
GTAP database. 
 
Estimating the effects of current distortions and reform alternatives 
Enormous progress has been made in the past two decades in using economy-
wide models to estimate economic effects of past and prospective trade-related policy 
regimes. Recent examples include the continuing disaggregation of the GTAP database 
regions to individual countries, and the provision of bound and applied bilateral tariffs at 
the same (HS6) level of disaggregation so as to know what cut in applied tariffs and 
subsidies to expect from commitments to reduce WTO-bound rates. Planned further 
disaggregation of the database’s products and regions over the next year or so will help, 
as will the inclusion of newly developed databases on bilateral international flows of 
labor and capital. With greater firm concentration in the value chain, it is becoming ever-
more important to include imperfect competition and scale economies in economy-wide 
models too.  
To capture more of the prospective economic gains from trade reform in 
economy-wide models, better dynamics need to be introduced. Recent research on the 
aggregate links between exports and productivity has been carefully examining the 
potential endogeneity of that interaction. Firm-level studies report evidence of 
productivity growth associated with learning-by-doing after firms enter exporting (Melitz 
2003, Blalock and Gertler 2005, Fernandes and Isgut 2006). Van Biesebrock (2004) finds 
that African exporting firms had higher productivity before entering export markets, and   18
that their productivity levels, and their subsequent rates of productivity growth, grew 
after entering export markets. Girma, Greenaway and Kneller (2004) find both higher 
initial levels of productivity and higher productivity growth rates after entry into 
exporting. There are also potentially important gains from improvements in the quality of 
exports. Hummels and Klenow (2005) suggest that these improvements in quality are 
sufficiently rapid that the prices received by countries for the products that they continue 
to export actually rise – in contrast to traditional Armington models which generate a 
reduction in export prices when economies grow and exports expand. Making these 
modifications to models will not only provide larger and more realistic projections of 
production, consumption and trade changes, but also of the overall projected national and 
global welfare gain from trade reform. 
Finally, the incorporation of regulations to foreign trade and investment in 
services is sorely needed, since there are indications that the costs of barriers to trade in 
services – including to farmers and agri-business – are very substantial.
7 But significant 
funding for a long-term research program will necessarily be required to make progress 
on this complex front.  
 
Analyzing the political economy forces behind distortionary policies 
Improving our understanding of the reasons behind the evolution of trade-related 
policies as economies grow is necessary partly because, as Stigler (1975, p. ix) says, 
“Until we understand why our society adopts its policies, we will be poorly equipped to 
give useful advice on how to change those policies.” But it is also necessary so that we 
can include more-appropriate counterfactuals in model projections. As mentioned in   19
footnote 3, typically the status quo is adopted as the baseline case by modelers when in 
fact rising agricultural protectionism – and hence higher estimated welfare gains from 
reform – may well be more realistic. 
Surveys of attempts to explain agricultural policies are available in Binswanger 
and Deininger (1997) and de Gorter and Swinnen (2002), while surveys focusing on 
explaining trade policy more broadly include Rodrik (1995) and Gawande and Krishna 
(2003). Following the pioneering theoretical work by Grossman and Helpman (2001, 
2002), substantial econometric progress has been made in recent years to test elements of 
that theory but, as Ethier (2006) warns, that should not be the only approach. It is 
possible also to use economy-wide models to back out politicians’ preferences from the 
estimated impacts of the protection structure on industry value added. Balaoing and 
Francois (2005) adopt that approach in analyzing EU trade policy. To use it for 
developing countries first requires bringing together comparable time series estimates of 
the structure of distortions in those countries. Then it will be possible to test hypotheses 
about trends over time and across industries, about changing choices of policy 
instruments (including the relative importance of exchange rate measures, indirect border 
measures such as manufacturing tariffs, and various agricultural price, trade and direct 




To progress this research agenda, a newly launched research project at the World 
Bank is revisiting the Krueger, Schiff and Valdes study but for a larger sample of 
countries. Its first phase is focusing on measuring the extent of direct and indirect   20
distortions to agricultural incentives since the 1950s, and providing a broad-brush 
analytical narrative explaining the evolution of each nation’s policy regime over that 
period. This is providing a rich springboard for the project’s second phase, which 
involves two streams of work. One will focus on empirical analysis of myriad economic 
effects
8 of those distortions using national and global economy-wide models. The other 
will focus in more detail on understanding the political economy forces behind the 
patterns of distortion across countries and over time, and behind the evolution in policy 
instruments used. This stream will draw in part on the distributional results emanating 
from modeling analyses.  
If this research provides stronger evidence that agricultural protection and 
subsidies not just abroad but also at home are ineffective in helping small farm 
households escape from poverty, it would make it easier to persuade governments and 
development agencies that reducing agricultural price distortions in developing countries 
leads to pro-poor growth. Such an outcome would be all the more likely if reducing 
distortions were to be accompanied by complementary domestic reforms such as 
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Source: Anderson and Hayami (1986, Table 2.5), updated by Honma and Hayami (2006).   29





































Source: Constructed from PSEs reported in OECD (2006).   30
Table 1. Import-weighted Average Applied ad valorem Tariffs,
a Primary Agriculture, 








Low-income countries  Primary agric  15 10  9
 Processed  food  40 16  23
 Non-agr  goods  26 16  13
    
Middle-income countries  Primary agric  14 15  13
 Processed  food  27 18  17
 Non-agr  goods  20 11  7
    
High-income countries  Primary agric  3 12  15
 Processed  food  7 9  5
 Non-agr  goods  4 3  2
 
a Unfortunately the ad
 valorem equivalent of specific tariffs are not included in these 
estimates, which means they underestimate the total rates, especially for high-income 
agricultural products. 
 
Source: UNCTAD TRAINS database, accessed from www.wits.org   31
Table 2. Black Market Exchange Rate Premia, Weighted Average Across 59 Developing 




1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1991-93 
 
North & Sub-Saharan Africa  23 45 75 23 
South & East Asia  233 25 15 6 
East Europe & Central Asia  277 231 238 5 
Latin America & Caribbean  13 34 89 9 
All developing countries in 
sample 




Source: Estimated using country data compiled by Easterly (2006) using the sum of 
export and import revenues as weights.   32
Table 3. Effects on Sectoral Value Added of Removing all Merchandise Import Tariffs 













Sub-Saharan Africa  2.3  2.7 
South Asia  0.3  -0.1 
E. Asia (excl. Ja, Ko, Ta)  9.5  5.0 
Latin America  11.5  -0.2 
All Developing Countries  5.6  2.0 
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2007)   33
Table 4. Impact of Full Liberalization of OECD Agricultural Tariffs and Subsidies on 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
                                                                     Change in regional welfare ($billion) due to: 
 Change  in 
 export 
prices 




Sum of export 
and import
price effects
Agric and food products – all SSA  0.94 -0.38  0.56
       South Africa  0.05 -0.09  -0.04
       Other Southern Africa
a  0.36 -0.03 0.33
       Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  0.53 -0.25  0.28
   
Non-agricultural products – all SSA  1.45 -0.53  0.92
       South Africa  0.35 -0.15  0.20
       Other Southern Africa
a  0.37 -0.10 0.27
       Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  0.72 -0.29  0.43
 
a Botswana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
 
b The numbers in this column have the opposite sign to the import price indexes in part 
(a) of this Table because an import price rise reduces real income (whereas numbers in 
the export columns have the same sign). 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 Argentina re-introduced export taxes in late 2001, ranging from 5 to 20 percent. 
2 A similar result is found by Tangermann (2005). 
3 If such growth in protection had been the counterfactual used by modelers assessing the 
consequences of China’s WTO accession, instead of assuming the status quo, the 
estimated national and global welfare benefits would have been several times larger. 
4 Evidence of such a bias in public expenditure in Latin American countries has been 
analysed by Lopez and Galinato (2007). 
5 Recent assessments of the role of economists and economic analysis in trade policy 
formulation conclude that while their contributions cannot be expected to be major, it can 
make a difference when carefully timed and targeted (Anderson 2005, Evenett 2006).  
6 Even though this violates the WTO’s national treatment rule, it apparently is not an 
uncommon practice in poorer countries where it is claimed to be too expensive to collect 
VAT on farm products. And with more than 100 countries now imposing value added 
taxes of 10 percent or more (Ebrill et al. 2001), this practice may be adding substantially 
to delivered rates of agricultural protection in developing countries. 
7 When services distortions are not included, there is the same problem with interpreting 
the welfare effects of goods trade reform generated by a general equilibrium model as 
there is from a partial equilibrium model of a subset of markets in the presence of 
distortions in other markets of that economy. For example, if services distortions exceed 
goods protection then decreasing the latter could worsen national economic welfare even 
though an economy-wide model which specifies zero distortions for services markets 
would suggest a welfare gain from a goods protection cut. Overcoming this problem   35
                                                                                                                                                 
requires building on the pioneering work reported in Findlay and Warren (2000) on 
measuring the extent of distortions to markets for services, and that of Jensen, Rutherford 
and Tarr (2006) and others who are incorporating those measures in their models. 
8 This phase will include analyzing the effects on poverty, building on recent frontier 
work by Hertel and Winters (2006) and Hertel et al. (2006). 